Years
CHR Forum: Providing and Consuming Security 3 Leaving a brilliant student unemployed until he could train as a pilot, fly a four-engine bomber, and destroy German cities had to be something only Homo the Sap could conceive. And the student, needless to add, died 5 (see table l ).
The wars also left a residue of bitter memories. In wartime, majorities felt entitled to impose their will; minorities felt helpless and betrayed. In the two world wars, conscription broke earlier promises and left a deep fissure between French and English Canadians. 6 Wartime paranoia, fed by pre-war hatreds, hurt German and Ukrainian Canadians in the First World War and Japanese Canadians in the Second.7 Perhaps the divisions were deeper because Canada's commitment to its twentieth-century wars was largely a matter of political choice. In 1899 and 1914 Canada was at war because the British Empire was at war, but in both cases, as much as in 1939, Canadians could decide how deeply to commit themselves to the struggle. They were not endangered by the Boer republics, nor by North Korea, Iraq, or Serbia. Canada was at the outer limit of even German geopolitics. However they might squirm at the responsibility, Canadians exercised the choice to become engaged. Why?
For much of the twentieth century, Canada was virtually invulnerable on three sides and, as its political leaders had recognized, indefensible on the fourth. On either coast, the world's two greatest navies, the British and subsequently the American, successively guaranteed that if an invasion came, it could not come by sea. Until the 1940s it was inconceivable that any attacking force could cross the Polar icecap and, until the 1950s, it was impracticable. 8 If Canada was immune from external assault, why did so many of its people have to fight and die? Why did a complex country of many and potentially conflicting allegiances force itself into the brutally divisive atmosphere of war, not once, but often? Most other nations of the Western Hemisphere avoided more than a brief and nominal engagement in the world wars. Why did Canadians, liberated from threats after so many violent and destructive centuries of alliance warfare, feel obliged to engage themselves? Spared from consuming security, why did Canadians feel bound to be providers?
The answer was linked to Canada's great vulnerability. To the south, Canada was as open to attack as Poland. Abenaki, Iroquois, Saulteaux, Sioux, English colonists, British regulars, and soldiers of the United States had flowed over that border to kill, pillage, and conquer. The endless land frontier between Canada and the United States ranked with India as the great defence problem of Queen Victoria's empire. Well into the l86os, Britain's treasury poured out millions in fortifications and strategic canals to solve it. In 1865 the colonial secretary, Edward Cardwell, assured Canada that if it was 'ready to devote all her resources, both in men and money to the maintenance of her connexion with the Mother Country, the Imperial Government fully acknowledged the reciprocal obligation of defending every portion of the Empire with all the resources at its command.' 9 This promise, and a guarantee for a $2 million fortification loan, made helpful arguments 8 Though arctic overflight was discussed in Popular Mechanics and kindred maga· zines in the 1930s, the region is not mentioned in the relevant volume of the official history of the RCAF: W.A.B. Douglas, The Creation of a National Air Force:
The Official History of the Royal Canadian Air Force, vol. 2 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press 1986). See also, however, the same author's 'Air Defence Dilemma in Canada, 1939 -1943 ,' Canadian Defence Quarterly 14 (1984 : 33-8. 9 Public Record Office (PRO), CO 42/693, 380-1, Papers Relating to the Conferences which Have Taken Place between Her Majesty's Government and a Deputation in the Confederation debates. The Civil War made it also obvious: there could be no successful rematch of the War of 1812. On n November 1871, after a brief delay to fend off Fenians and ensure an orderly tr an sf er of the Red River Colony to Canada, the last British troops left Quebec. Britain might respect Cardwell's 1865 commitment, but there would be no hostages to guarantee it. The decision benefited all sides. The British liberated themselves from a hopeless military commitment. Free to invade Canada whenever they wished, Americans chose not to. Canadians had sense enough not to provoke them. One of Britain's most valuable gifts to Canada was an agreed boundary with the United States. In 1871 the British took Sir John A. Macdonald to Washington and 'wiped the slate' of outstanding Anglo-American issues, at some expense to Canada. The lesson was obvious: keeping peace with the Americans might be costly and annoying, but the alternatives were worse. Ottawa used the fortification loan guarantee to help build the Intercolonial Railway. When a disorderly prairie frontier threatened to bring us cavalry north, Canada created a police force and sent it west, literally to keep the peace. 10 Ottawa never quite forgot Cardwell's commitment. Until 1896 governments usually spent a million dollars a year on defence. Ottawa enlisted a few hundred soldiers to guard the fortresses at Quebec and Kingston and to train militia gunners. Other schools at Quebec, St-Jean d'Iberville, Toronto, London, and Winnipeg, opened in 1883 and 1886, trained infantry and cavalry. A little garrison at Esquimalt pretended to defend British Columbia. The rest of the money allowed 40,000 militia two weeks of camp, usually in alternate years. The wealthy and their sons provided the officers and regimental funds in return for rank and social status. Other ranks joined for sports, outings, sham battles, and an escape from late-Victorian boredom. This formula worked better in Ontario than in French-speaking Quebec, but Canada's militia met all challenges, from scores of episodes of aid of the civil power to the 1885 rebellion.11 To reinforce British links, Britain took the top four graduates from the Royal Military College Canada, which had opened at Kingston in 1876. From 1868 to 1919 a British officer held the top appointment in the militia. 12 One of the ablest, Colonel Ivor Herbert, who arrived in Canada in 1890, recognized that Canada's defence budget served political ends. Wisely, he tried to make the militia more congenial to French-speaking Catholics and focused on the lamentable state of the few permanent troops, hoping to make them a useful contribution to imperial defence. Denounced as a Catholic and for encouraging the despised 'regulahs,' Herbert went home early, but some of his ideas remained.' 3 Eventually, Canada's armed forces had to accept two national languages, after refusal to do so had cost them and Canada heavily. And Herbert's permanent force would be the core of most of Canada's military contributions. In 1899 , 1950 , and 1999 regular units provided the personnel for limited wars and peacekeeping; in 1914 and 1939 the reserves recruited the larger forces mobilized for the world wars. Rivalry between regulars and reserves continued through the twentieth century, coinciding with even more ruthless struggles once a Canadian navy and airforce brought their voracious appetites to Ottawa in l9IO and 1924, respectively.' 4 The idea that Canada was a provider of security became popular among its delegates to the League of Nations in the 1920s. The phrase conveyed both a smug reminder of Canada's role in the Great War and a broad hint from Canada's policy elite that future provision should not be taken for granted -or even seriously. At the time, Canada possessed two aging ocean-going destroyers, a couple of thousand professional Wilfrid Laurier University Press 1980), 81-97; and ' Aid to the Civil Power: The Canadian Militia in Support of Social Order, 1867 -1914 ,' Canadian Historical Review 51, 4 (1970 In 1917 Sir Robert Borden had put Allied victory ahead of his national and political interests; even in the darkest moments of 1940, King made no such error. As King explained to a horrified British delegation during negotiations on the British Commonwealth Air Training Plan, 'it was not Canada's war in the sense that it was Great Britain's.'s 4 In the eyes of J.L. Granatstein and Norman Hillmer, chief arbiters of Canada's fin de siecle historical wisdom, King's prudent opportunism made him the century's greatest Canadian prime minister.ss King's contemporaries might have been astonished; their descendants would understand.
In the end, of course, it was Canada's war. During its six years, Canadians far exceeded their accomplishments in 1914 -18. Between 1939 and 1945 per cent of the male population between the ages of eighteen and forty-five. All but 99>407 of them were volunteers, and at least some Canadians served on every front. The 50,656 women were all volunteers, though officials of National Selective Service forced members of both sexes to labour in jobs they might not have chosen. 'There was a war on.' To avoid conscription, King and his minister of munitions, C.D. Howe, dwarfed the munitions production of the earlier war. By 1941 Canada's war orders had surpassed a billion dollars. Twenty-eight federally owned crown corporations delivered whatever private business could not produce, from synthetic rubber to Lancaster bombers. By 1945 Canada had built 878 warships and merchant vessels. New factories turned out 4000 aircraft a year, and 4000 trucks and 450 armoured vehicles a month, plus artillery, radios, and radar sets and enough enriched uranium to end the Pacific war with two terrible bomb blasts.s 6 In the dark days of 1940, the fall of France briefly promoted Canada to become Hitler's second most powerful enemy. With Britain on the verge of defeat, Canada's security needs dramatically changed. No longer the smug 'provider,' it suddenly faced a huge security deficit. Canada, 1939 -1945 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer 1970 British prime minister how much he had done for Anglo-American relations. Churchill grumpily responded that there could be 'two opinions about that.' 57 Even in their own crisis, Churchill and his advisers recognized that Canadians might, in other circumstances, have had second thoughts about switching empires. Indeed they would, but, as Granatstein has argued, without much rebuttal, Britain's weakness gave them no affordable alternative. 58 As a provider of troops, Canada enhanced its autonomy within and, ultimately, beyond the empire. As a consumer of American security, Canada's autonomy was at risk. Sovereignty concerns were discreet but serious. After Americans established bases in Newfoundland, Canada feared for its traditional influence on the island; it sent more troops and a general who matched the rank of his American counterpart. When us army engineers, pouring into the Canadian Northwest in 1942 to build a road to Alaska, began to outnumber Canadians, the British high commissioner alerted Ottawa. A former president of the Canadian Legion arrived in a oc-3 to show the flag. To extinguish any claim, Canada systematically paid for each American base on its territory. In the postwar years, Canada was as nervous about American as about Soviet activity in its North.
Igor Gouzenko's defection from the Soviet Embassy in Ottawa in September 1945 was the first episode of the Cold War. Left to his own judgment, Mackenzie King might well have sent the cypher clerk back to a grisly fate. 59 The nuclear espionage Gouzenko unmasked helped create the weapons that terminated Canada's century of immunity. Uranium and its use changed Canada's security far more than the fall of France. During the war years the Americans had developed bombers which, with a single refuelling, could leap the Arctic ice cap and return. In American and Soviet hands, nuclear weapons gave such bombers a payload worthy of a one-way trip. Instead of frozen isolation, Canada's Arctic became the buffer zone between two increasingly hostile super- powers. By 1948 the PJBD had become a justification for converting Canada's armed services to American equipment, doctrine, training, and, ultimately, values. 60 While the army had emotional reservations about cutting its British ties, the more technology-minded navy and air force embraced the change with special enthusiasm: the war had taught them that the Americans would have the best tools of the trade and certainly the newest. 61 In the 1950s long-range aircraft and both tactical and strategic nuclear weapons dramatically changed the international military equation. Located between two hostile super-powers, Canadian air space became as important to the United States as it was to its official owner. Ottawa's reward for allowing development of the Distant Early Warning Line was American acknowledgment of Canada's 1881 claim to the Arctic. In return for nominal recognition of Canada's arctic sovereignty, Washington would defend Canada as if it were its own territory. The North American Air Defence Command {NORAD) agreement of 1957 was not the Cardwell commitment of 1865; it placed split-second decisions about the life and death of Canada and the United States in the hands of American generals based under a mountain in Colorado. 62 Postwar Canada changed in other ways. For the first time, most Canadians knew affiuence. The l95I census found that the definably poor in Canada were a minority. And only 47 per cent of all Canadians were of British stock. By 1971 the 'Others' numbered 24 per cent. British Canadian influence, the power that had sent Canadians to three wars, was fading in age and vigour, but it could still be felt. When Canada joined the Americans in condemning the British and French invasion of Egypt in 1956 and Lester Pearson won a Nobel Peace Prize for brokering a face-saving withdrawal, the new Conservative leader, John Diefenbaker, raged at the betrayal of the mother country -and he did not rage alone. Diefenbaker's 1957 victory grew out of other issues, but, as Murray Beck discovered, the Suez issue played well in British Columbia. 63 A change of government tested the new American relationship too. Having scrapped the hugely expensive Arrow fighter project in favour of a Bomarc air defence missile, Diefenbaker read his mail and refused to acquire its American-controlled nuclear warhead. In October 1962 he preferred his own judgment to John F. Kennedy's on the Cuban Missile Crisis and ordered Canada's forces to stand pat. Appalled, most of Canada's defence establishment simply ignored him. The resulting row broke up Diefenbaker's government. On 8 April 1963 Canadian voters returned to the Liberals under Pearson. 64 As a defence provider, Canada had tried to limit its international entanglements; as a major consumer, it sought them, if only to find friends to mitigate the influence of its powerful new protector. 'Twelve in the bed means no rape,' joked Canadian diplomats as they helped create the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) . Canadians cared even less about Korea than they had about South Africa in 1899, but Ottawa offered warships, airlift capacity, and ultimately a 5000-member brigade group in 1950 because, as a security consumer, Canada had to prove its commitment to collective security. 6 5 George Washington warned his countrymen against 'entangling alliances.' Napoleon concluded that he would rather fight allies than have them. In contrast, Canada's military commanders soon learned to revel in alliances. Seldom able to make a peacetime case for enhancing the defences of their 'hermit kingdom' and aware that wartime alliances had given them real forces to command, Canadian admirals, generals, and air marshals welcomed the postwar links with the United States. NATO was as providential for them as it was for the Department of External Affairs, and soldiers, sailors, and flyers each worked out distinct and unrelated roles for themselves. A Canadian air division integrated neatly with the US Air Force; a Canadian infantry brigade served with the British Army of the Rhine, and the navy resumed its wartime submarine-hunting role under American command. Alliance commitments opened federal coffers and, for once, gave Canada's peacetime armed forces whatever they needed. Service at allied headquarters gave officers professional experience and promotions unimaginable for their pre-war counterparts. Creation of the joint NORAD command, in response to improved Soviet bombers and missiles able to put Sputnik in orbit, allowed the RCAF a subordinate but significant alliance role in its own homeland.
Even 68 Did it get value for money? In a country that ranked second or third in income levels, depending on professionals cost a lot. So, too, did Canada's large inventory of camps and bases. The old but popular 'made-in-Canada' policy cost most of all. The memories included ill-made uniforms, the Bain wagon, and H2S radar, but Ottawa never forgot that defence dollars had the extra duty of providing jobs, business, and votes.
Canadian-made weapons fed national pride. Sir Sam Hughes had defended the operationally defective but Canadian-made Ross rifle because it won prizes for Canadians in international target shooting. As minister of defence production during Cold War rearmament, C.D. Howe held to his wartime claim that Canadians could produce anything. Postwar fighters and warships emerged from Canadian factories and dockyards. Weapons grew more sophisticated and hugely more expensive. The Soviet Sputnik satellite signalled a future of intercontinental missiles. Nuclear-powered submarines would cruise offshore, loaded with nuclear-tipped missiles. Space-age fantasies had to be tested. Lesser great powers, Britain and France, grumbled and, by 1960, finally admitted that they could afford only selective or joint entries in the world arms race. In 1959 Canada signalled its dropout by cancelling the Avro Arrow, its supersonic fighter project. A large publicly funded industry collapsed. Canadian nationalists passionately mourned its demise, though even a splendid airframe without avionics, a weapon system, or a proven engine was quite literally an arrow with neither a bow nor an archer. 69 Inevitably blamed for 'killing' the Arrow, the Americans rescued Canada's defence industries, as they had in 1917 and 1941, by giving them generous access to American markets.7° Canada, of course, had to return the favour. The Arrow's replacement was two batteries of a dubious anti-aircraft missile, the BOMARC, and some squadrons of F-101 Voodoos, which the Americans had relegated to their Air National Guard. 71 For the rest of the century, most defence debate in Canada centred on hardware, and its competing claims of job creation, regional benefits, and technological transfer.
There was very little discussion of strategy.7 2 Military roles were presumed to be constant. Any Third World War would be fought with nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons that would make Europe, and perhaps much of the world, a wasteland. Was this the defence Canada wanted to consume? Rival service chiefs were no help. Each defended distinct alliance roles and his service's hardware priorities. A chairman of the chiefs of staff committee was merely primus inter pares. Each service chief approached the minister directly. So, too, did each service's political friends and business allies. In Pearson's 1963 government an unusually stubborn minister, Paul Hellyer, took on National Defence. By 1967 he had integrated the command structure and created a unified, single-uniform Canadian Forces. 73 Hellyer made less difference than he thought. The new 'environments' retained their old alliance roles, and Hellyer's successors got little more help than his predecessors in sorting out priorities. 7 4 In 1968 a new prime minister inherited Canada's defence problems. Pierre Elliott Trudeau reflected many of Henri Bourassa's views about Canada, bilingualism, and defence. He had travelled the world, but he felt no need for Canada to defend it. The Cold War, he suspected, had been unnecessary and the arms race was dangerous. Pearson's defence policy had favoured peacekeeping and alliances over Canada's own home defence. Trudeau reversed the order: Canada became Priority One; peacekeeping came last. When all available forces were sent to Quebec for the 1970 October crisis, one application of Priority One became evident. 75 Cabinet colleagues kept Trudeau from pulling Canada out of NATO, but he halved the Canadian forces in Germany and transferred the remaining soldiers from British to American and German command at Lahr.7 6 Few Canadians even noted the significance. Trudeau and his defence minister, Donald S. Macdonald, also tackled the problem of conflicting military advice. War, Georges Clemenceau had once claimed, is too important to be left to generals: Why not invite civilians, with no vested interest in submarines or tanks, to share policy-making roles? Senior officers resented 'civilianization' more than unification. By the century's end, distinct uniforms and separate Maritime, Land, and Air Force commands had been restored, but the civilians were entrenched. 77 Some of Canada's allies had done the same.
Trudeau's effort to reduce alliance dependence and Canada's 'consumption' of defence cut military strength by one-third from the Cold War high. It also led to equipment obsolescence and demoralization. 78 In the era of Thatcher and Reagan, Trudeau had no great success as an apostle of detente, while Canada's peace movement condemned him for allowing us cruise missile testing on Canadian soil.7 9 Newly elected in 1984, Brian Mulroney proclaimed that his priority was good relations with Ronald Reagan's America. Torn between tax cuts and White House pressure to improve Canada's defences, the Mulroney government shared ·an employers' discovery: part-time workers could cost less. Adopting an American-born 'total force' concept, the Canadian reserves would supply men and women to 'augment' regulars. Washington was not pleased with another Canadian initiative: a dozen nuclear-powered submarines could operate in all three of Canada's oceans. By 1989, Canadian critics had loyally sunk the project; henceforth, American submarines would tell Canadians whatever the Pentagon thought they needed to know about activities under the Polar icecap. 80 In 1989 the Cold War whimpered to a close. Perhaps a Soviet attempt to match Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative, a space-age scheme to intercept incoming ballistic missiles, was the final straw. Perhaps it was the creaky, corruption-ridden Soviet system. There was no truce, no armistice, and no peace settlement; only perestroika and fragments of a shattered Berlin Wall. For a time, little changed. It took until 1993 to bring Canadian forces home from Europe, and Ottawa promised to send them back if needed. In 1990 six more patrol frigates were ordered from the Saint John dockyard. Cynics called them a reward to New Brunswick for endorsing the Meech Lake accord. Elected in 1993, Jean Chretien's Liberals cancelled the submarinehunting helicopters that made the new warships effective, but the arguments centred on costs, not strategy.
Would a post-Cold War world be more dangerous than ever? In August 1990 John Mearsheimer in The Atlantic Monthly warned that we might soon miss the relative tranquillity of the Cold War. 8 ' On cue, Iraq invaded Kuwait. Canada dutifully responded to Washington's call. While part of the army faced off against armed Mohawks near Montreal, naval and airforce professionals practised their skills in the scorching heat of the Persian Gulf. Ottawa's caution and obsolete equipment kept Canadians out of the most dangerous fighting, and they came home without a casualty. 82 Canadian soldiers went to Croatia in 1991 and to Bosnia in 1992, though few expected the horrors or the risks. Late in 1992, at Washington's urging, more Canadian troops went to Somalia. Shut out of the Gulf War, the army should have said no. Instead, it sent a problem unit, and the full Canadian Forces lived out the brutal and then humiliating consequences after a Somali teenager died following a brutal beating by the troops. In 1999 upgraded Canadian CF-18s flew NATO missions against Serbia, and the army provided its only state-of-the-art equipment -reconnaissance helicopters and vehicles for a British armoured brigade. 83 What armed forces did Canada need at the century's end? The world had exploded in conflicts, but not in Canada's neighbourhood. Pressed to explain the current threat, NORAD -now the North American Aerospace Command -warned of computer hackers, and the possibility of missile development by North Korea and other 'rogue' regimes. 84 In Congress, one faction urged a revived anti-ballistic missile defence system against such a threat; others demanded a total commitment to a 'Homeland Defence' in which Canada was featured as too easy a route for terrorists, heroin smugglers, and mere illegal immigrants. Would twenty-first-century Canada have to conform to a paranoid view of the world, or find itself on the glacis outside a new Fortress America? 85 'Soft power,' urged as a Canadian alternative by Canada's last foreign affairs minister of the century, Lloyd Axworthy, seemed an ironic description of bombing Serbia and Kosovo. 86 The Chretien government professed to ignore advice from Janice Stein and a Liberal-dominated Council of 21 to dispose of costly weapons and transform the Canadian Forces into a short-service peacekeeping force, designed to withdraw from danger. 87 A 1994 white paper on defence pledged a reduced force of 60,000 regulars and 30,000 reservists, capable of 'fighting the best alongside· the best,'
